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Abstract 
 
 As practicing Muslims become an increasingly large share of the population in 
Western European countries, governments encounter the challenge of preserving 
liberal democratic societies in the face of a force often considered to be in direct 
opposition to the values of those societies. This paper discusses the challenges of the 
governance of Islam in Western Europe and evaluates the validity of the perceived 
threat of Islam to European values. Through analysis of scholarly work and 
interviews with experts in relevant professional and academic fields, this paper 
identifies three myths about Islam that contribute to this perceived threat: Islam is 
anti-democratic, anti-modern, and cannot function in a secular society. This paper 
attempts to deconstruct the manufactured binary between East and West that paints 
Islam and Europe as oppositional forces by highlighting the many common values and 
ideas shared by both worlds.  
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Part I 
Introduction 
 
A Clash of Civilizations:  
 In 1996, Samuel P. Huntington wrote about a “clash of civilizations” in which 
people’s cultural and religious identities would be the primary sources of conflict in the 
modern era. As millions of migrants seek refuge abroad and populist political parties 
employ the powerful rhetoric of hate, the “culture wars” of which Huntington wrote do 
not seem so far-fetched. In fact, according to Bronwyn Winter (2008), almost two-thirds 
of French citizens believe that religion is more likely to be a source of conflict than of 
peace. Why is this the case? Are we truly living in a ‘clash of civilizations’?   
In the last several years, violent conflict in the Middle East has forced millions of 
people to flee their home countries and migrate to Europe. In 2016, Muslims made up 
4.9% of Europe’s population–up to 8.8% in France–which is a 6.3 million increase in 
European Muslims migrants in the past ten years (Pew Research Center, 2017). This 
trend is likely to continue. According to the Pew Research Center, even if all migration 
into Europe were to immediately stop, the Muslim population of Europe would still be 
expected to rise to 7.4% by 2050 due to birth rates. But as armed conflicts in the Middle 
East rage on, it is unlikely that migration will cease. Based on current trends of 
migration, the Muslim population in Europe could reach anywhere between 11.2% and 
14% by 2050 (Pew Research Center, 2017). This dramatic increase in the presence and 
visibility of Islam in Europe has not only caused social friction; it has challenged 
European methods of governance.  
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Europe has historically been a continent of emigration rather than immigration. 
Western Europe has only recently begun to experience the religious pluralism that has 
existed for decades in countries like the United States, Canada, and Australia. According 
to Phillip Connor (2010), the growing population of religiously active immigrants “has 
created immense pressure” on European governments to “devise appropriate strategies 
for immigrant incorporation” (p. 377). Diversity puts a strain on political establishments 
by forcing them to accommodate for different value systems and lifestyles.   
Despite Western European democracies’ commitment to the principle of freedom 
of religion, some governments have come dangerously close to infringing on the 
religious rights of Muslims.1 Governments are faced with the difficult task of preserving 
traditional Western ideals in the face of something they believe to be entirely 
oppositional: Islam. After looking extensively at contemporary discourses about Islam, 
both scholarly and of the general public, I have identified three pervasive myths that 
contribute to the manufactured idea that Islam is incompatible with Western societies: 
first, that Islam is anti-democratic; second, that Islam is anti-modern; and third, that 
Islam cannot exist in secular societies.  This paper explores the relationship between 
Islam and the West in an effort to prove that they can, and do, coexist. I will prove that 
despite many differences in values and cultures, the West and Islam are not 
incompatible. Islam is not a threat to the European way of governing. I will also suggest 
                                                     
1 See Osmanoglu and Kocabas v. Switzerland, Achbita v. G4S Secure Solutions, 
Bougnaoui v. Micropole SA, Quardiri v. Switzerland, Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, and 
many others.  
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ways that European governments and Muslim immigrant societies can make 
adjustments that benefit both parties by promoting a peaceful coexistence.   
 
 
Literature Review:  
 The subject of Islam and Europe has been studied extensively. One estimate 
claims that there are a few thousand publications on the topic (Foner & Alba, 2008). 
The majority of these publications were written recently; according to Viet Bader 
(2007), the number of works on the Muslim presence in Europe has “literally exploded” 
in the last ten years (p. 872). The history of scholarship on Islam has been marked by a 
shift from studying the internal structure of Islam and Muslim culture, to studying the 
formation of Muslim associations, organizations, and identities, and finally, to studying 
the ways in which societies react to Islam (Bader, 2007). Overall, research has evolved 
from an internal to external focus.  
However, the existing body of scholarship on the topic is inadequate because it 
perpetrates a false dichotomy between Islam and the West, which fuels the paranoia 
that Islam is a threat to Western society. According to Nancy Foner & Richard Alba 
(2008), “religion is generally viewed as the problem, not the solution for immigrant 
minorities” (368). Thus, scholars extensively analyze the ways that Islam acts as barrier 
to immigrant integration. These claims have helped to cultivate the widespread mindset 
that Islam and the West are irreconcilable. In essence, the majority of scholars have 
used their position as intellectual elites to reinforce the alarmist rhetoric of the ‘culture 
clash’.  
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Furthermore, the existing body of scholarship largely ignores the role of 
governance. Governance is the manner of governing a state, including the establishment 
of policies and continuous monitoring of their proper implementation. According to Viet 
Bader (2007), the concept of governance is not reflected in the “literatures on 
multiculturalism in general and on religious minorities in particular” (p. 873). Scholars, 
particularly sociologists, tend to focus on describing and explaining the diversity of 
religious beliefs and practices. The governance of this religious diversity has been widely 
neglected, however.  
 
 
Research Methods and Ethics: 
 The ideas in this paper are informed by a variety of primary and secondary 
sources. Secondary sources are published books and journal articles written by scholars 
of relevant topics or research reports published by reputable nonpartisan fact tanks. 
These sources were collected from both physical libraries, such as the United Nations 
library, and online databases, such as JSTOR and Academic Search Premier. Secondary 
sources were gathered based on their relevance to the topics of Islam in Western 
Europe, the concepts of religious freedom and secularism, and the governance of liberal 
democratic societies and Islamic societies. Primary sources consist of personal 
interviews with experts in the field of the research. These interviews were conducted in 
Geneva, Switzerland, Paris, France, and Brussels, Belgium. Interviews were both formal 
and informal in structure. Formal interviews consisted of a pre-arranged appointment 
where I asked the expert a fixed set of questions. Informal interviews, on the other hand, 
happened at opportunistic moments and more closely resembled a conversation 
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between parties. These informal interviews helped me generate ideas about this 
research and gain insight into possible solutions, but will not be quoted directly in the 
body of this work.  
 I approached formal interviewees primarily because of their expertise on the 
subject. Other considerations included willingness to participate, references by 
professors, and ease of access. I conducted four formal interviews. Dr. Maya Hertig-
Randall is a professor of public law at the University of Geneva, specializing in European 
comparative constitutional law with an emphasis on human rights protection. Dr. 
Michel Oris is a professor at the University of Geneva, where he teaches demography, 
economic and social history, and socio-economy, specializing on dynamics of social 
structures. Dr. Abbas Aroua is the director and founder of the Cordoba Foundation of 
Geneva, an independent non-profit organization working on violence prevention and 
peace promotion through unique expertise in Islam. Dr. Brigette Maréchal is a professor 
of sociology at the Catholic University of Louvain in Brussels, Belgium. Her work 
focuses extensively on European Islam.  
 Interviews were conducted with ethical considerations in mind. Each interviewee 
was aware of their right to refuse to answer any question or stop the interview at any 
time. These interviews were recorded, but only after the interviewees gave consent to be 
recorded. The recordings were transcribed and the interviewees were given the 
opportunity to amend the transcript if necessary. Having entire transcripts of the 
interviews also serves as a safeguard against the misinterpretation or misrepresentation 
of data on my part. None of the interviewees in this research project expressed concerns 
about their privacy. The nature of the research did not solicit personal information or 
anecdotes. Rather, I asked questions geared towards their academic and professional 
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experience. Furthermore, interviewees were asked to speak about an entire population 
of people, not about individuals. These factors contributed to the theoretical and 
intellectual nature of the research. However, each interviewee was nonetheless given the 
option to remain anonymous.  
 
 
Defining ‘Muslims’:  
 Researching an entire social, ethnic, or religious group is an endeavor that 
requires acknowledgement of the heterogeneity that exists within the group. Muslims 
come from a diverse range of identities, including, but not limited to nationality, 
ethnicity, culture, socioeconomic class, and political affiliation. We must especially be 
careful to avoid what Nadia Jeldtoft (2009) deems the “ethnification of Islam,” as there 
is no exact relationship between ethnicity/nationality and religion. Since religion is only 
one aspect of Muslims’ identities, there is likely significant variability in how religious 
individuals actually are and how important the Muslim identity is to them. Thus, I 
acknowledge the reality of the many nuances within the term “Muslim.” However, in 
order to create the descriptive data set for this research endeavor, it was necessary to 
simplify these groups.  
 To respect these diverse identities, “Muslims” should be viewed as a category, not 
a group. People belong to the same category because they share at least one attribute, 
however prominent that attribute may be. Groups, on the other hand, have many more 
attributes in common, and are usually characterized by a certain degree of 
interdependence, group self-identification, and favoritism, also known as in-group bias 
(Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988). Muslims are a category because individuals may identify as 
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Muslim but do not see themselves belonging to the same group as another Muslim. This 
method of distinguishing categories versus groups gives researchers “a platform for 
empirical studies” of the complex realities of Muslim minority groups in Europe 
(Jeldtoft, 2009, p. 10).  
Furthermore, it is crucial that I, as the researcher, acknowledge my positionality. 
I am not Muslim, nor European. I should not, and will not, pretend to have a firsthand 
understanding of the struggles of Muslim immigrants or European communities tasked 
with accepting migrants. We must remember that Muslims in Europe are minorities 
that “have been described mainly by the majority” (Jeldtoft, 2009, p. 11). Research is a 
process that should reinforce the agency of its subjects, not further marginalize the 
marginalized. The purpose of this project is to better understand the nuances that exist 
in European Islam as it relates to cultural integration, religious freedom, and 
governance. While the individual stories of Muslim migrants to Western Europe are 
valuable, they are not the focus of this project.  
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Part II 
Past vs. Present 
 
A Brief History of Islam in Europe: 
 Popular media uses attention-grabbing headlines like “the rise of Islam in 
Europe” and “will Islam conquer Europe?,” which insinuate that the presence of Islam 
in Europe is a new phenomenon. However, Muslim communities have existed in some 
part of continental Europe for centuries. According to historians Jørgen Nielsen & Jonas 
Otterbeck (2016), the history of Islam in Europe can be divided into three phases. The 
period of Islamic Spain and Muslim rule in Sicily and southern Italy introduced the 
European continent to Islam. In 711, Muslim General Tariq ibn-Ziyad launched a 
campaign that brought most of the Iberian Peninsula under Islamic rule. The Normans 
expelled the Muslim presence from Italy in the eleventh century, but the last Muslim 
foothold in Spain lasted until the 1492 Spanish Reconquista.  
 The second phase of Muslim presence in Europe was the result of Mongol armies 
during the thirteenth century. The successor states established by these armies became 
Muslim populations. As traders and soldiers, many of these communities established 
colonies in places such as Finland, Poland, and the Ukraine. In fact, one of these 
communities known as the Khanate of the Golden Horde left a permanent Muslim 
population stretching from the Volga River basin north of the Caspian and Black Seas all 
the way down to the Crimea.  
The third phase is a more well-known period of Islamic history: The Ottoman 
Empire. During the height of the empire, the Ottomans expanded into the Balkans and 
central Europe. Faced with the occupation of an Islamic empire, many of the subject 
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populations converted to Islam. This pattern occurred so frequently that Albania 
became a country with a Muslim majority during this time. Many Muslim Turkish 
populations who settled in Europe during this time still exist today in parts of Bulgaria, 
former Yugoslavia, Romania, Macedonia, and Greece. After losing Vienna, the Ottoman 
Empire retreated back towards West Asia. This retreat left behind many Ottoman 
soldiers, either as stragglers or prisoners. There are many historical accounts of these 
individuals taking up trades and professions and settling permanently in the area. 
Throughout history, Muslims have lived and thrived in Europe, contributing extensively 
to European culture and development.  
History clearly demonstrates that the distinction between a Muslim East and 
non-Muslim West is blurry at best. Thus, discussions about ‘Islam and the West’ 
reinforce a binary that has little historical validity and is predisposed to focus on 
conflict.2 Through this binary, created by the denial of historical fact, Islam becomes the 
‘Other’. Ironically, according to H. A. Hellyer (2009), European identity itself was even 
created through the process of “defining ‘Europe’ through contradistinction to Islam” (p. 
2). We must recognize that this school of thought is essentially Orientalist. Orientalism, 
a theory created by Edward Said (1978), is based on a distinction between ‘the Orient,’ 
or the East, and ‘the Occident,’ the West. The Orient is one of Europe’s “deepest and 
most recurring images of the other” (Said, 1978, p. 9). Not only is the relationship 
between East and West one of sharp division, it is also “a relationship of power, of 
                                                     
2 This is the reason behind the title of this work, ‘The Islam of Europe’. Naming the 
paper “Islam and Europe” would only reinforce the same binary I seek to discredit in 
this paper.    
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domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony” (Said, 1978, p. 13). In other 
words, “Orientalism is the Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having 
authority over the Orient” (Said, 1978, p. 11). Essentially, Orientalism is the belief that a 
sharp binary exists between ‘us’ superior Europeans and ‘those’ inferior non-European 
peoples and cultures. Orientalism perpetuates the myth that Islam is incompatible with 
democratic, modern, and secular societies.   
It is crucial to understand the historical context of the Muslim presence in 
Europe in order to analyze the roots of the debate and create future solutions. Clearly, 
the West has written the historical narrative. The idea that Islam is fundamentally in 
opposition to Western governance loses credibility when we use history as a tool. When 
our analysis is based in historical fact, we can begin to break down the manufactured 
dichotomies between East and West and recognize these arguments for what they really 
are: a product of Europe’s Orientalist tradition.  
 
 
Integration:  
 If Islam has been present in Europe throughout history, what distinguishes its 
present-day circumstances? For one, the Muslim presence in Europe today exists on a 
much larger scale. Islam is the second largest religion in Europe after Christianity and 
the fastest-growing religion in the world. More importantly, however, today’s discussion 
of Islam in Europe concerns integration. In the three historical phases described above, 
Islam came to Europe through imperial force. In each phase, Muslim and European 
empires fought for dominance and decision making was concentrated on a large scale. 
Today, however, Muslims migrants come to Europe as individuals searching for safety, 
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peace, and economic prosperity. And the task ahead is not territorial conquest; it is 
integration into the local host community.  
 It is important to note the distinction between integration and assimilation. 
According to Dr. Maya Hertig-Randall, integration means “respecting the legal order,” 
while assimilation, on the other hand is to “live like the others” (personal 
communication, October 18, 2018). Immigrants have a duty to integrate into their host 
culture3; they do not, however, have a duty to assimilate. Furthermore, this duty does 
not fall entirely on the immigrants themselves. Both the immigrants and the natives play 
a role in facilitating successful integration. As Justin Gest (2012) describes, it is an 
“equilibrium of adaptation” where each party must adjust their preferences to reach a 
“mutually acceptable set of relations” (p. 192).  
In popular media, it is often said that Muslims value their faith obligations above 
civic duties. Thus, they are supposedly incapable of successfully integrating into liberal, 
democratic countries, such as those of Western Europe. This, in turn, puts the entire 
cohesion of European societies at risk. It is true that the Islamic societies from which 
these Muslim migrants come are strongly religious in their values, while most Western 
countries are almost always more secular (Norris & Inglehard, 2012). However, research 
demonstrates that Muslims migrants are successfully integrating into European society, 
despite the difference in religiosity. For example, a 2012 study by Justin Gest, which 
                                                     
3 For example, see Switzerland’s Federal Act on Foreign Nationals. Other examples 
include policies that require immigrants to meet certain integration criteria before 
residency permits are renewed or federally mandated courses in the national language 
for all immigrants.  
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surveyed key integration indicators, including national identity and fertility rates, 
demonstrates that Muslims and their descendants are integrating into Western societies 
“the way others did before them” (p. 190). Gest’s research proves that Muslim migrants 
are not more inhibited by their religious faith than other immigrant groups.  
Take, for example, the topics that have shown to be the most different between 
Muslim and Western societies: religiosity, gender roles, and sexual norms. Analysis by 
Pippa Norris & Ronald Inglehard (2012) shows that the opinions of Muslims living in 
Western societies fall “halfway between the dominant values prevailing within their 
countries of destination and origin” (p. 230). In other words, Western Muslims may be 
more ‘conservative’ on these issues than non-Muslim Europeans, but they are certainly 
more ‘liberal’ than Muslims living in predominantly Islamic societies in the Middle East. 
The research of Norris & Inglehard (2012) suggests that Muslims are adopting aspects of 
European culture while still retaining some portion of the value system of their home 
country. The work of Pippa Norris, Ronald Inglehard and Justin Gest clearly disprove 
the common misconception that Muslim migrants are simply importing their own 
culture, society, and value system to the West.  
Europe’s Orientalist scholarship has contributed to the cultivation of three myths 
about Islam that contribute to the understanding of Islam and the West as 
irreconcilable, opposing forces. First, that Islam is inherently anti-democratic and that 
the religious convictions of Muslim citizens prevent them from participating in a 
democratic system of government. Secondly, that Islam is inherently anti-modern, 
directly contradicting the West’s commitment to liberal, progressive societies. And 
third, that Islam cannot exist in a secular society, thus damaging the very foundation of 
European governance and freedom of religion. These powerful myths lay the 
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groundwork for the widespread paranoia that Islam represents a threat to the European 
way of life.  
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Part III 
Three Myths 
 
Islam & Democracy:  
 One of the main reasons that Islam and the West are viewed as incompatible is 
because Islam is seen as an anti-democratic force, which threatens the democratic basis 
of European governance. It is true that very few governments of Muslim-majority 
countries are democracies. This is because autocratic leaders and militaristic regimes 
have used Islam as a tool to manipulate the public, like many other religions in the past. 
But Islam itself, as a religion, is not inherently anti-democratic. There is nothing within 
the beliefs and practices of Islam that make it impossible for Muslims to live in and 
participate in democratic systems of governance. It is dangerous to make “baseless 
claims” that “Islamic religiosity influences the attitudes of individuals and communities 
in ways that are different from other religions” (Gest, 2012, p. 190). In fact, many ideas 
in Islam reflect the same values as democratic societies. There are ten basic Islamic 
concepts that guide Muslims’ beliefs, practices, and lifestyles4: Din, Islām, Īmān, Ihsān, 
Rahma, Haqq, Karāma, Adl, Jihad, and Shari’a.  
Karāma and Adl most clearly illustrate how democratic principles are reflected in 
Islam. Karāma is the Arabic word for ‘dignity’. According to Abbas Aroua (2013), 
Karāma, or dignity, is considered to be “one of the pillars of human right in Islam, along 
                                                     
4 Islamic principles come from two sources: The Quran and the Hadith. The Quran is 
believed to be the word of God, containing about 6,500 verses, and the Hadith is the 
compilation of sayings from the Prophet Muhammad, containing about 25,000 verses.   
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with peace, freedom, fairness and equality” (p. 33). Thus, practicing Muslims attempt to 
live according to Karāma by respecting the human rights of others, especially through 
commitment to human dignity. Aroua (2013) notes “the dignity of the human being 
must therefore be protected and promoted by the community/State” (p. 33). It is 
important to note two things about this interpretation. First, the state plays a role in 
enacting the principle of Karāma. Islamic societies live by Karāma in both the private 
and public spheres. Secondly, Karāma requires an active approach. Not only must 
Muslims abstain from interfering with the dignity and human rights of others, they must 
also actively and consciously promote it. Furthermore, this commitment applies to all 
people because dignity is a value “shared by all the human family,” which means that 
“there is no privileged gender, class or cast,…people or nation” (Aroua, 2013, p. 33-34).  
This description of human rights closely resembles the rights and freedoms 
protected by the European Convention on Human Rights.5 For example, the Convention 
protects: the right to life guaranteed by Article 2, the freedoms from torture and slavery 
guaranteed by Articles 3 and 4, the right to liberty guaranteed by Article 5, the right to 
privacy and family life guaranteed by Article 8, and the prohibition of abuse of rights 
guaranteed by Article 18, among others. These rights and freedoms apply to all citizens 
                                                     
5 The Council of Europe was created after World War II to protect human rights 
and the rule of law and to promote democracy in the 47 member states. The Council 
created the Convention on Human Rights in 1953. Today, the European Court of Human 
Rights enforces the rights and freedoms laid out in the Convention. The ECHR is similar 
to the English Bill of Rights, the United States Bill of Rights, the French Rights of Man, 
and the German Basic Law.  
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of the signing nations regardless of race, gender, creed, etc. The similarity between 
Islamic human rights according to Karāma and European human rights according to 
Conventions and constitutions demonstrates that Islam is compatible with modern 
democracies in regards to their commitment to human rights.   
Similarly, ‘Adl is an Islamic principle that encompasses fairness and justice. 
Living according to ‘Adl means “being fair and just in dealing with others” (Aroua, 2013, 
p. 36). Like Karāma, ‘Adl goes further than interpersonal interactions; in fact, “fairness 
is viewed in the Islamic tradition as the pillar of governance and the foundation of 
civilization” (Aroua, 2013, p. 37). According to Islam, the state has a responsibility to 
ensure fairness and justice. Furthermore, like Karāma, ‘Adl applies to all people 
“irrespective of their social status” and not only with fellow Muslims, but also “when 
dealing with non-Muslims” (Aroua, 2013, p. 37).  
 Again, the principle of ‘Adl is reflected in the European Convention on Human 
Rights. For example, the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6, the freedom from 
punishment without law guaranteed by Article 7, and the prohibition of discrimination 
guaranteed by Article 14. These protections in the ECHR intend to make sure that every 
citizen is treated fairly by the state, by institutions, and before the law. Fairness and 
justice are fundamental conditions of democracies because they ensure equal 
participation in political and social life. Without fairness, the democratic order would 
collapse and peace would no longer be sustained. The Islamic principle of ‘Adl 
demonstrates that Muslims are committed to the same sorts of fairness, justice, and 
equality that are essential to the foundation of democracy.  
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Islam and Modernity:  
 The second myth that contributes to the manufactured binary of Islam versus the 
West is the idea that Islam is not and cannot be modern. This misunderstanding is 
partly due to views about religion generally in an increasingly secular and non-
practicing world, and partly unique to Islam. Since the Enlightenment in Europe, 
“religion has been perceived as a dogma that is against ‘rational’ or ‘universal’ (liberal) 
values” (Malik, 2016, p. 68). Emmanuel Kant, one of the leading philosophers during 
the Enlightenment period, was instrumental in arguing that using reason is superior for 
understanding all issues except lofty metaphysical ones. Moreover, the influence of 
religion was inappropriate in all matters except those of this specialized sphere. Thus, 
religious beliefs are often viewed as “superstitious nonsense, a collection of weirdly 
unscientific claims that must surely be swept away over time by the greater powers of 
reason” (Marshall, 2008, p. 140). According to first name Malik (2016), it was on “this 
division of intellectual labor that Western modernity was founded” (p. 68). Essentially, 
Western definitions of modernity exclude any reference to religious value systems and 
beliefs.  
This strain of thought has been exacerbated by the growing non-religiousness of 
many Western societies. Religiosity has experienced a “drastic and dramatic decline 
throughout most European societies since the 1950’s” (Casanova, 2009, p. 210). 
According to Dr. Maya Hertig-Randall, as European society becomes less religious, there 
is “less patience for religious demands because it doesn’t seem rational” (personal 
communication, October 18, 2018). Again, rationality dominates society and religion is 
relegated to the sidelines because reason is considered to be the basis of modernity. 
Furthermore, the idea that religion is anti-modern is particularly present in discussions 
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on Islam because of its association with the Eastern world. Over time, modernization 
has become increasingly synonymous with ‘Westernization’. However, as societies 
modernize, they do not necessary Westernize. The two terms have been socially 
constructed to be equivalent. Thus, there is a false understanding that Islam is stagnant; 
it lives in the past and is averse to progress.  
However, there are aspects of religion that actually promote modernity, in the 
sense of progress and development. Maszlee Malik (2016) wrote extensively on this 
relationship in Foundations of Islamic Governance. For example, religion motivates 
people to participate in civil society, thus serving goals such as poverty eradication and 
education. Education is particularly tied to religious activities, as seeking knowledge and 
accumulating wisdom is often encouraged. The values espoused by Islam cultivate 
personal traits of “ethics, thrift, honesty, and openness to people” (Malik, 2016, p. 72). 
These traits may increase levels of trust and reduce levels of corruption and criminal 
activities. The value of honesty is particularly relevant because it increases adherence to 
business ethics, which is essential for healthy growth of economies.  
In fact, Adam Smith (1976) acknowledged the contribution of religion to the 
success of the modern capitalist economy in his book An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Smith explains how religion creates the “moral 
enforcement” mechanism of economic development and an environment of “good 
temper and moderation,” both of which are essential to sustained growth and 
governance (p. 793-794). All these religiously motivated activities contribute to what 
Malik calls “social capital, which is essential to growth and development, hence good 
governance” (p. 72). The many ways in which Islamic values contribute to societal 
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progress and prosperity demonstrate that Islam is not anti-modern and its role in 
society may even help to promote modernity.  
 
 
Islam and Secularism:  
 The third myth contributing to the false claim that Islam and the West are 
incompatible is the idea that Islam cannot exist in a secular society. Proponents of the 
third myth often point to the term ‘ummah’ as evidence. ‘Ummah’ is an Arabic word for 
a Muslim community. The word is used to expresses the unity and equality of Muslims 
from diverse cultural and geographical backgrounds. In the Quran, it refers to people to 
whom God has sent a prophet or to people who are part of God’s divine plan of 
salvation. The problem from a Western perspective is that the term has both the 
“religious meaning of a community of believers and the modern secular meaning of 
nation, that is, a political community organized around common laws” (Winter, 2008, p. 
81). Therefore, the term is used to make the argument that there is no separation 
between religion and state in Islam. However, according to Bronwyn Winter (2008), the 
fact that the same term has both these meanings “does not denote any necessary or 
automatic link between the two [religion and state] in Islam” (p. 81). While the term 
‘ummah’ is used in the Quran, “nowhere in the Quran is there any suggestion that what 
is contained therein should be the basis for a political system” (Winter, 2008, p. 82). 
Ironically, at other points in history, the idea of separation of religion and state has been 
even more unthinkable in Catholicism than it is in Islam today.  
 Arguments such as these warrant a closer examination of the definition of 
secularism. Secularism is the policy of the separation of government institutions and 
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religious institutions. Secularism is based on the principle of freedom of religion. 
Freedom of religion is a human right under the United Nations Declaration on Human 
Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the constitutions of most 
liberal democratic nations. It is a complex concept that implies many smaller freedoms. 
According to Viet Bader (2007), it is “a constellation of overlapping and sometimes 
conflicting claims for specific freedoms” (pg. 131). For example, freedom of religion 
encompasses the freedom from persecution or discrimination because of religious 
beliefs or practice, freedom from state-sponsored religion, freedom of religious 
association, freedom to enlist state cooperation in carrying out religious purposes, 
freedom to express, publish, distribute, and teach religious views, and many more. 
These many freedoms that make up the principle of religious freedom can be classified 
into two types of freedoms: negative and positive. Negative religious freedom is the 
freedom of religion from state control and interference. Positive religious freedom is the 
freedom to believe and practice.  
While secularism is supposed to enable the exercise of freedom of thought and 
expression, this freedom is only possible at the price of submission to the authority of 
the state. Bronwyn Winter (2008) describes this double standard; secularist policies 
both “[grant] equal status to all religions and…[keep] a watchful eye and even a 
controlling hand over what religious organizations are doing” (p. 8). Thus, secularism is 
not truly the separation of government and religious institutions; it is the domination of 
religious institutions by the government. Furthermore, secularist policies intend to 
maximize equal treatment of all religions under the law (Bader, 2007). In theory, this 
puts all religions on an equal playing field. But in practice, “the actual playing field in 
the religious market has been massively and unfairly shaped by governments” by 
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historical and cultural predispositions (Bader, 2007, p. 134). States have privileged 
specific religions throughout history and cannot be culturally neutral. Thus, “states have 
systematically or structurally disadvantaged minority religions” (Bader, 2007, p. 134).  
The comparison of Islam and Christianity in secular Western European 
governments is example of the disparity between religions due to historical and cultural 
factors. The European Wars of Religion were a series of religious wars waged in 16th and 
17th century Europe after the Protestant Reformation in 1517. These wars continued until 
about 1710. The settlements after these centuries of religious conflict resulted in deeply 
institutionalized religious identities. According to Nancy Foner & Richard Alba (2008), 
the Christian religion has been institutionalized in Europe in a way that makes it 
difficult for Islam to achieve equality.  For example, France uses a system of laïcité, 
wherein religion is completely excluded from the affairs of the state. While laïcité is the 
official ideology, the state owns and maintains most Christian churches and allows them 
to be used for regular religious services (Foner & Alba, 2008). It is due to patterns of 
“special privileges accorded to majority denominations” that “Muslims cannot help but 
be aware of the secondary status of their religion” (Foner & Alba, 2008, p. 381).  
Furthermore, the specific policies of secularism in Western Europe 
disproportionately affect Muslims due to the nature of the practice of Islam. Maya 
Hertig-Randall notes that Islam prescribes many more guidelines for daily life, from 
what to eat to how to dress to when and how many times per day to pray. This is a major 
distinction from Christianity, which prescribes much fewer and less specific lifestyle 
rules. Thus, the public nature of Islam is something to which the Christian majority has 
trouble relating (Hertig-Randall, personal communication, October 18, 2018). The 
result is that “forms of social and cultural activity based on religious principles are 
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frequently seen as illegitimate” (Foner & Alba, 2008, p. 378). The denial of Islam’s 
legitimacy is the basis of discrimination against publicly religious individuals that, 
according to Michel Oris, exists only against Muslims (personal communication, 
October 16, 2018).  
Secularism is idealistic; it functions in theory, but fails in practice. The types of 
secular policies that currently exist in Western European nations fail Muslims. What 
impact does this have? The language of this paper is theoretical, but these policies have 
tangible effects on the lives of thousands of people. Religion is an inextricable part of 
one’s identity. It shapes how we view ourselves, our relationships with others, and the 
world. Religious identity cannot be separated from other parts of our lives. This is why 
freedom of religion is a human right. Unfortunately, according to H. A. Hellyer (2009), 
“European laws on the right to religion as a basic human right do not contain the 
necessary elements for assuring the same rights for Muslims in Europe as for all others” 
(p. 5). It’s time to reevaluate the role of secularism in Western liberal democracies. 
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Part IV 
Towards a Solution 
 
A Balancing Act: 
While research demonstrates that Muslim immigrants can and are integrating 
into their host communities in the West, there remains significant frustration that they 
are not doing enough to adapt, particularly in regards to religion. Research by Phillip 
Connor (2010), demonstrates that acceptance of Muslim immigrants is closely tied to 
their outward religiosity; “less religiously active immigrant Muslims…are associated 
with more welcoming contexts of receptivity,” and vice-versa (p. 394). Brigitte Maréchal 
also noted this phenomenon, describing how acceptance is more difficult for Muslims 
with “strong religious appearances” (personal communication, October 2, 2018).  
Furthermore, there is a “reactive effect” for those publicly religious individuals 
who are not greeted with receptivity: their “religious resilience actually deepens” 
(Connor, year, p. 394). Michel Oris reinforced this pattern by making a sociological 
observation that humans tend to intensify their identities when rejected by others 
(personal communication, October 16, 2018). When minorities such as Muslims feel 
that their identities are not respected by the law and accepted in society, they may 
become increasingly strict in their religious convictions and rigid in their practice and 
way of life, making the governance of Islam even more difficult. Social exclusion and 
deprivation of recognition will only make the Muslim presence immutable for those that 
wish it gone. Western European societies must encourage Muslim immigrants to 
integrate while also resisting the urge to force assimilation. Governance of Islam is a 
balancing act for European host nations.  
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Building Consensus: 
 What measures can Western European governments take in order to facilitate 
social harmony and just governance of Muslim immigrants? Philosopher John Rawls 
(year) developed the theory of ‘overlapping consensus’ in order to address situations 
where identity groups have drastically divergent cultures, lifestyles, and worldviews, 
such as the situation of Muslims in Europe. ‘Overlapping consensus’ is the theory that a 
diverse society can achieve social and governmental cohesion if both parties come to 
consensus on a conception of justice. Political notions of justice that are founded solely 
on self or inter-group interest are “inevitably fragile” (p. 2). But when faced with 
“opposing religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines” that result in different 
“conceptions of the meaning, value, and purpose of human life,” stable social unity can 
be secured only if the hybrid society’s conception of justice is based on consensus (p. 9). 
Even if each party starts out with a different premise, their principles, standards, and 
ideals eventually intersect or converge, thus forming the basis for consensus. With the 
public recognition of a common conception of justice supported by a constitutional 
government, society can overcome the deep divisions of religious and cultural pluralism.  
 The concept of ‘overlapping consensus’ can be applied to the situation at hand. 
Islamic societies and European societies value similar concepts like human rights, 
fairness, and equality, and have similar definitions for these concepts. Thus, both groups 
would likely be able to agree on a common understanding of justice that can be 
practically executed. Policy makers should utilize similarities between the two societies 
to break down the manufactured binary between Islam and the West that has 
dominated history and address the ways that both parties can move forward together. 
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Part V 
Conclusion 
 
The Future of European Governance: 
Discourses about Islam in Western Europe are riddled with the assumption that 
Muslims cannot thrive in European society. This assumption is generated from the 
deeply rooted myths that Islam is inherently oppositional to democracy, modernity, and 
secularism, formed by a tradition of Orientalist thought. European governments and 
societies must accept that religious landscapes are diversifying. It is no longer a question 
of if there will be Muslim communities in Europe, rather, the question remains what 
those communities will look like. Will they be characterized by continuous violations of 
Muslims citizens’ right to the freedom of religious expression? Or, will they reflect a true 
effort to promote social cohesion, just governance, and legal equality based on 
consensus? The future of European governance must not be colored by false notions of 
history, insurmountable cultural divides, and ignorance of the other. A ‘Clash of 
Civilizations’ can be avoided if we acknowledge the manufactured binary between East 
and West that is so deeply ingrained in our understanding of Islam.  
  
Limitations of the Study: 
 This study observes patterns in the discourses about Islam in the West. However, 
there are always exceptions to patterns. Each European country has their own social and 
political circumstances that must be considered. The conclusions of this paper may not 
be applicable in every situation.  
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Recommendations for Future Study:  
Dr. Abbas Aroua believes the biggest barrier to resolving disputes between 
Muslims and Europeans is ignorance of Islam (personal communication, September 20, 
2018). Future study should be used to disseminate knowledge about the values, belief 
systems, and practices of Islam. Researchers should focus their attention on the 
similarities between Islamic and European societies in order to generate solutions that 
promote social cohesion, just governance, and true legal equality.  
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Work Journal: 
 
 
Chronology: 
 
Date:  Activity:  
September 7 Met with Dr. Matilla to discuss the topic 
of my research  
September 9  Reached out to possible interviewees  
September 12 Reached out to possible interviewees 
September 20  Interviewed Dr. Abbas Aroua  
September 26  Reached out to possible interviewees 
October 2 Interviewed Dr. Brigitte Maréchal  
October 4 Reached out to possible interviewees 
October 5 Visited the Institut des Cultures d’Islam 
and spoke with Bénédicte Villain  
October 12 Reached out to possible interviewees; 
Refined my research question   
October 15 Prepared interview questions for Dr. 
Hertig-Randall and Dr. Oris 
October 16 Interviewed Dr. Michel Oris 
October 18 Interviewed Dr. Maya Hertig-Randall 
October 19 Met with Dr. Matilla to discuss the 
direction of my research, possible 
contacts, and the goals of analysis 
November 6 Created an outline for the paper 
November 7  Reached out to possible interviewees; 
Began gathering secondary sources  
November 8 Attended Geneva Peace Week at the UN; 
Listened to a lecture by Professor Vicken 
Cheterian; Asked Professor Cheterian a 
few questions after the lecture 
November 9  Gathered all secondary sources; Added to 
and refined existing outline 
November 10 Began closely reading and taking notes on 
secondary sources 
November 13 Finished taking notes on all secondary 
sources; Met with Dr. Matilla to discuss 
progress and discuss analysis of the 
research 
November 14 Organized sources into the outline  
November 15 Wrote the ‘Research Methods and Ethics’ 
section; Wrote the ‘Defining Muslims’ 
section  
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November 16 Wrote the ‘Historical Background’ 
section; Wrote the ‘Literature Review’ 
section  
November 17  Wrote the ‘Islam and Democracy’ section 
November 18 Wrote the ‘Islam and Modernity’ section; 
Wrote the Introduction  
November 19 Went to the SIT office to look at examples 
of previous ISPs for tips on organization; 
Edited the existing writing; Wrote the 
‘Islam and Secularism’ section  
November 20  Wrote the ‘Towards Solutions’ section 
November 21 Wrote the Conclusion section  
November 22 Edited the complete draft 
November 26 Completed final edits of paper; Organized 
other materials needed to submit the 
project  
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Interview Questions and Write-ups: 
 
Formal Interview #1: Dr. Abbas Aroua, Director of the Cordoba Foundation of Geneva 
 
Islam as a religion is not that different from the ones we are more familiar with in the 
West. Why is perception of Islam so far from the truth?  
• Ignorance of Islam is a huge barrier.  
• People use terms and concepts from Islamic tradition without deepening their 
understanding of Islam.  
• Journalist and politicians especially must be careful to uphold intellectual rigor 
and accuracy so they don’t spread false information about Islam.  
 
In what ways does religion fuel conflict?   
• Religion constitutes an important element of one’s identity. We cannot get rid of 
it. It’s important because it addresses the inner aspects of life. It shapes our 
worldview, including how we see our past, future, and life purpose. 
• When you have different communities with different values and worldviews 
living in the same territory, sometimes they find themselves in conflict.  
• Conflict is okay, it is a human phenomenon. The problem is violence. 
• The best was to deal with these conflicts is to focus not on the differences, but on 
the similarities. We should focus on concrete things that could, and should, be 
done together.  
• If you want to interact positively with another community, focus on a goal you 
can achieve together.  
• Religion can ignite or fuel conflict, but it is also a good way to transform or 
resolve conflict. Religious actors can also be actors in creating peace.   
 
How is religion used to perpetrate violence?  
• In Islam, some groups have twisted the concept of jihad to use it to perpetrate 
violence 
• Jihad is the fight for goodness and justice. It can be internal, within oneself, or 
external, by addressing persecution and discrimination. Jihad is not a goal or an 
end point, it is a manner of living. There are many forms of jihad, like dialogue.  
• Jihadism, on the other hand, is an ideology that considers jihad as a goal. 
Furthermore, they use armed jihad without first considering non-violent means. 
These people see armed jihad as an obligation. 
• People do not understand the nuance between jihad and jihadism.  
 
What is the future of Islam in Europe? 
• With emerging populist rhetoric, Islam is oversimplified. This poses a problem 
for Muslims in Europe.  
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Formal Interview #2: Dr. Brigitte Maréchal, Professor at the Catholic University of 
Louvain 
 
How are Muslim migrants integrating into Western European culture, particularly in 
regards to religion?  
• Europe has borders that are much more porous than, say, the United States.  
• Muslims who have a more religious outward appearance, such as a long beard or 
headscarf, will have more trouble integrating because members of the host 
community find it to be excessive. These physical signs are very important in 
integration.  
• In some cases, being religious might help you because you may have networks of 
people in that religious community who can help you.  
• Migrants still feel an obligation towards their country of origin.  
 
What are the main challenges faced by the migrants themselves?  
• First, migrants have to know the language, the institutions, and frameworks of 
the society.  
• They must have competencies or skills that allow them to get a job, which in turn, 
allows them to pay rent, buy food, etc.  
• There are so many factors besides religion that have to be taken into 
consideration when talking about integration.  
• Immigrants are just trying to be autonomous.  
 
How do Western European governments balance the need for freedom of religion with 
their governmental interest to have an integrated society?  
• There is a polarization on Islam  
• People do not feel at ease because of terrorist attacks. These attacks are 
something that really shapes people’s images of Muslims  
• Many Europeans don’t know much about Islam and, in fact, are not particularly 
interested in knowing more about it.  
• If you know the history of Muslim countries, you can understand why what is 
happening there is happening and the root of these tensions.  
• Integration cannot happen if Europeans do not open up. Both sides are afraid to 
make the first move. But if no one puts in any work, then nothing will happen.  
• In Belgium, for example, immigrants are required to take a course to learn the 
language of the region. They consider that knowing the language is compulsory. 
This allows immigrants to speak to their neighbors, help their kids with their 
homework, and participate in political life.  
• They also educate immigrants on their rights and duties as members of the 
society, which is very good.  
• We cannot just accept migrants and then not follow up. After accepting them, 
there is a job to be done. If governments don’t put in the work towards 
integration, then there will be people on the streets, stealing and causing unrest.  
• The far-right is also a big problem. If we don’t solve the migration crisis, we will 
have many social problems which fuels the far-right. We are in a difficult time 
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where there is a lot of pressure on society. In this sense, Islam is only the tip of 
the iceberg.  
 
 
 
 
 
Formal Interview #3: Dr. Michel Oris, Professor at the University of Geneva 
 
Do you think the European Court of Human Rights has been adequately addressing 
claims that governments have violated article 9 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights?  
• Declined to give a personal opinion.  
• The court is deciding according to the law and according to the principle of 
human rights in cases of the European Justice Court.  
• It is these principles that the Court must interpret and the Court sometimes has 
to weigh what is more important.  
 
 
How much should a government adjust laws in order to accommodate the cultural 
differences of immigrants? What factors should the state consider when balancing 
respect for individual freedoms with the desire for social unity and cohesion? 
• It is difficult to know the precise opinion of individuals involved, which is an 
issue. The individual freedom belongs to the individual, not to the community 
that he or she is a member of.  
• Integration is a bit different in different parts of Europe. In the French tradition, 
for example, you only need to fill in the paperwork under the condition that you 
want to become French, and then you are. In German culture, however, you need 
to really belong to the community.  
• In some places today, there are municipalities that still vote on an individual case 
by case basis on the naturalization of immigrants. This has led to some scandals.  
• For example, there was a case in Basel where parents were refused naturalization 
because they refused to shake hands with the examinators on the basis that it was 
against their religion.  
• There was also a situation where two Muslim male children refused to shake 
hands with a female professor.  
• So, we need to consider the traditions of each region because in some areas 
things like this would be a problem and in some it wouldn’t.  
• 95% of the time, situations like these are solved diplomatically. But when it is not, 
the media latches on to the case and it becomes very important.  
 
Do you think the growing secularization in Western Europe will ever jeopardize 
freedom of religion for those that do continue to practice and believe? 
• There is a difference in this between the United States and Europe. It is 
impossible to be elected the president of the U.S. if you say that you are not a 
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believer. But, in Europe, many presidents and prime ministers are not believers 
and have had no problems with this.  
• A behavior or attitude against religious practice in Europe in the last two decades 
is something that has existed only against Muslims, not against Catholics, or 
against Protestants, or others.  
• Humans keep their identity for two reasons. First, you keep it because you have a 
positive reason; you have a language, a celebration, cultural capital to transfer to 
your children, and so on. But you also keep your identity when you are rejected 
by the others.  
• The Jews in France in the late 19th century are an example. Many people did not 
even know they were Jewish because they did not participate in public practices 
like going to synagogue or eating Kosher. But the wave of Anti-Semitism after the 
Dreyfous case pushed them to be stricter, more rigorous Jews.   
 
 
 
 
 
Formal Interview #4: Dr. Maya Hertig-Randall, Professor at the University of Geneva 
 
Do you think the European Court of Human Rights has been adequately addressing 
claims that governments have violated article 9 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights?  
• The court used to be much more liberal in terms of freedom of religion cases. 
They said it was the individual freedom that was more important than other 
things. These other obligations are not fundamental to the person’s chances in 
society.  
• The Court has changed its case law a bit and now it is stricter in the sense that it 
forces people to do certain things that they claim are against their religion.   
• She finds the later approach to be not respectful enough of freedom of religion. 
She thinks the Court should have been more generous.  
• Yet, the European Court of Human Rights is there to safeguard a minimal 
standard. It is an international tribunal so it doesn’t have the same sort of strong 
legitimacy as the American Supreme Court.  
 
Can you speak a bit about integration and it’s standing as a legal argument? 
• She does not find integration to be a convincing legal argument.  
• Integration means respecting the legal order, but it does not necessarily mean 
that one must live like the others.  
• Foreigners have a certain duty to integrate, but not if it violates freedom of 
religion. This system is similar to ‘reasonable accommodation’ in the United 
States.  
• If you force people to integrate by denying their religion, it might be 
counterproductive.  
• Courts have been rather generous on some specific issues of religion, such as 
giving leaves for religious holidays. There is not a bright line policy for special 
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dispensation. It is unclear what would happen if people objected to sexual 
education, or something of the sort, based on religious grounds.  
 
What is the future of European law in regards to these issues about religion in public 
life that seem to keep arising? 
• That is still to be decided. It is up to the people’s vote.  
• There are situations where people have voted for or will vote on banning veils and 
burkas in public. She thinks that is a major issue.   
 
Do you think the growing secularization in Western Europe will ever jeopardize 
freedom of religion for those that do continue to practice and believe? 
• As society gets more secular, there is less patience for religious demands because 
they don’t seem rational.  
• If you look at the Christian religion, it doesn’t prescribe very much daily life. This 
is a major distinction when it comes to Islam, which regulated things like dress 
and food. The Christian, often non-practicing, majority simply can’t relate to this.  
• Because of 9/11 and the fight against terrorism, there is an idea that Muslims are 
generally radical. People tend to assume that anyone wearing religious garments 
is radical or dangerous.  
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Locations of Research:  
1. United Nations Library: Avenue de la Paix 8-14, 1211 Geneva 
2. University of Geneva Library at Uni-Mail: Boulevard du Pont-d’Arve 40, 1205 
Geneva  
3. The Graduate Institute (IHEID): Chemin Eugene-Rigot 2, 1202 Geneva  
4. Ex-Machina Café: Rue du Vieux-Marché 11, 1260 Nyon  
5. Municipal Library Pâquis: Rue du Môle 17, 1201 Geneva 
6. SIT Office: Rue de Monthoux 64, 1201 Geneva  
7. Ecole-Club Migros: Chemin du Créve-Coeur 1, 1260 Nyon  
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Human Resource List:  
  
Name Title Place of 
Employmen
t 
Phon
e 
Email Address Area of 
Expertise 
Abbas 
Aroua 
Director The Cordoba 
Foundation 
of Geneva 
+41 
(0) 22 
734 
15 03 
abbas@aroua.com Islam, Islamic 
Society and 
Governments, 
Conflict 
Resolution, 
Peace 
Studies, 
Cross-
Cultural 
dialogue 
Brigitte 
Maréchal  
Professor of 
Sociology  
Université 
Catholique 
de Louvain  
+32 
10 47 
42 51 
brigitte.marechal@uclouvain.b
e 
European 
Islam, 
Political 
Islam, 
Relations 
between 
Muslims and 
non-Muslims 
Bénédict
e Villain 
Assistant 
Director  
Institut des 
Cultures 
d’Islam  
+33 1 
53 09 
99 86 
benedicte.villain@ici.paris Islamic 
Society and 
Culture  
Michel 
Oris 
Professor of 
Demography, 
History, and 
Socioeconomic
s 
Unitersité 
de Genéve 
+41 
(0) 22 
379 71 
11 
michel.oris@unige.ch  History, 
Dynamics of 
Social 
Structures, 
Demography, 
Religion and 
Morality   
Maya 
Hertig-
Randall  
Professor of 
Public Law 
Université 
de Genéve  
+41 
(0) 22 
379 
8530 
maya.hertig@unige.ch  European 
Constitutiona
l Law, 
Comparative 
Constitutiona
l Law, Human 
Rights law 
Vicken 
Cheterian 
Professor of 
International 
Relations 
Webster 
University 
Geneva 
 cheterian@webster.ch Political 
Islam, 
Genocide, 
Nationalist 
Movements, 
Armed 
Conflict, 
Revolutions 
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Interactive Log:  
 
Organization Contact 
name 
Address/email Phone Date(s) & 
time of 
interview 
Formal/informal 
interview 
The Cordoba 
Foundation 
Abbas 
Aroua 
Chemin des 
Vignes 2BIS, 
1209 Geneva  
 
abbas@aroua
.com   
 
+41 (0)22 
734 15 03 
September 
20th, 2018 at 
12:15  
Formal 
Université de 
Genéve 
Maya 
Hertig-
Randall 
24 Rue du 
Général-
Dufour, 1211 
Geneva 
 
Maya.Hertig
@unige.ch  
+41 22 379 
85 30  
October 
18th, 2018 @ 
14:15  
Formal 
Université de 
Genéve 
Michel 
Oris 
24 Rue du 
Général-
Dufour, 1211 
Geneva  
 
Michel.Oris@
unige.ch  
+41 (0)22 
379 71 11 
October 
16th, 2018 @ 
15:00   
Formal  
UN: Geneva 
Peace Week  
Lecture by 
Vicken 
Cheterian: 
Genocide 
and 
Writing 
the 
History of 
the Middle 
East 
Palais de 
Nations, UN 
Headquarters 
in Geneva 
Avenue de la 
Paix  
1211 Geneva 
 
Annie.werom
ian@yahoo.c
om 
n/a November 
8th, 2018 @ 
13:00  
Informal  
Université 
Catholique 
de Louvain  
Brigitte 
Maréchal 
Place 
Montesquieu 
1, 1348 
Leuven, 
Belgium   
 
+32 10 47 
42 51 
October 2nd, 
2018 @ 
13:30 
Formal 
Baranko 44 
Brigitte.mare
chal@uclouv
ain.be 
Institut des 
Cultures 
d’Islam 
Bénédicte 
Villian  
56 Rue 
Stephenson, 
75018 Paris  
 
benedicte.vill
ain@ici.paris 
+33 1 53 
09 99 86  
October 5th, 
2018 @ 
16:00  
Informal  
 
 
 
